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Law And Peace*
MYRES S. McDoUGAL**
The establishment and maintenance of a comprehensive peace,
through law rather than by arbitrary violence and coercion, is today com-
monly regarded as one of humankind's most urgent and difficult
problems. To achieve a productive understanding of what law may con-
tribute to peace, of the inextricable interrelations of law and peace, it is
necessary that we observe the larger context of global processes of inter-
action that contain and condition both law and peace. We must formulate
appropriate conceptions of law and peace, note the inadequacies in our
inherited theories and procedures designed to serve peace and, finally, ap-
ply to the general problem, and numerous particular problems of promot-
ing peace, certain relevant intellectual tasks. These tasks, extending be-
yond the unsystematic, anecdotal pursuit of random strategies in effective
power, or the traditional logical derivation from allegedly autonomous le-
gal rules, include the postulation and clarification of basic community
goals, the examination of past trends in the achievement of such goals,
the exploration of the factors that affect degrees in achievement, the pro-
jection of possible futures, and the recommendation of alternatives in de-
cision process and particular decisions that promise a higher degree of
success.
We proceed to explore these points of inquiry and intellectual tasks
seriatim.
I. THE LARGER CONTEXT
In realistic perspective, it can be observed that the whole of human-
kind today constitutes a single comprehensive community, entirely com-
parable to its many internal territorial and other communities, in the
sense of interdetermination or interdependence in the shaping and shar-
ing of all values. 1 This larger community is composed, not merely of an
aggregate of nation-states, but of expanding billions of individual human
beings who create, in addition to nation-states, a whole host of other
groupings and associations, such as international governmental organiza-
* This article was originally written as a background paper for the United States
Institute of Peace Conference on "Toward the Twenty-First Century: An Investigation of
the Roads to Peace," held June 20-21, 1988 at Airlie House, Airlie, Virginia. It will
eventually be published in the proceedings of that conference.
**Sterling Professor of Law, Emeritus, Yale Law School, New Haven. B.A., M.A.,
LL.B., University of Mississippi, 1927,1935; B.A., B.C.L., Oxford University, England, 1930;
J.S.D., Yale Law School, 1931.
1. Detailed description is offered in McDougal, Reisman & Willard, The World Com-
munity: A Planetary Social Process, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805 (1988).
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tions, political parties, pressure groups, and private associations special-
ized to all demanded values, in activities increasingly transcending all ter-
ritorial boundaries. The interdependences that characterize this larger
community process, and all its internal component communities, include
both those within any, and every, particular value process and those that
cut across all value processes. The interdependent activities within, and
across, all value processes stimulate, affect and are affected by all decision
processes, lawful and unlawful.2
A most important component in this larger community process is an
ongoing, all pervasive process of effective power, totally global or earth-
space in reach, in which decisions are in fact taken and enforced by se-
vere deprivations or high indulgences, oftentimes irrespective of the
wishes of any particular participant. 3 For some centuries nation-states
have been, and remain, through the resources and people within their
boundaries, the principal institutions through which people wield effec-
tive power and have engaged in a continuous balancing of such power. In
a world in which people and goods are in continuous and increasing
movement, the bases of power are no longer hermetically sealed within
the boundaries of particular nation-states. Resources are important only
as potential values, dependent upon transnational activity; and as science
and technology advance and universalize, enlightenment and skill, as well
as conceptions of rectitude and responsibility, become of increasing sig-
nificance as bases of power.
Upon close examination, it may be observed that the decisions taken
within this comprehensive process of effective power are of two different
kinds. 4 Many decisions are of course taken through sheer naked power or
from considerations of expedience, without regard for common interest.
Goliaths do not always live, or balance power, easily with pygmies. Many
other decisions, however, may be observed to be taken from perspectives
of authority, in the sense that they are made by the persons who are ex-
pected to make them, in accordance with criteria expected by community
members, in established structures of decision, with enough bases in ef-
fective power to secure consequential control, and by authorized proce-
dures. The continuous flow of this second type of decision may be realisti-
cally described as a comprehensive process of authoritative decision by
2. These interdependences are minutely outlined in M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L.
CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER ch. 1 (1980) [hereinafter McDOUGAL, LASS-
WELL & CHEN).
3. See generally, McDougal, Reisman & Willard, The World Process of Effective
Power: The Global War System, in POWER AND POLICY IN QUEST OF LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR
OF EUGENE VICTOR ROSTOW 353 (M. McDougal & W. Reisman eds. 1985); G.
SCHWARZENBERGER, POWER POLITICS (3d ed. 1964); W. Reisman, Private Armies in a Global
War System: Prologue to Decision, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1973).
4. For descriptions of these two types of decisions and their interrelations, see M. Mc-
DOUGAL & W. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS (1981) and M. McDOUGAL & W. REIS-
MAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE: THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE WORLD
COMMUNITY ch. 1 (1981).
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which the effective elites of the global community, after the fashion of
elites in lesser communities, seek to clarify and secure their common in-
terests. The decision processes of the most comprehensive, global commu-
nity affect the shaping and sharing of values both as between and within
. all its constituent communities, of whatever geographic or functional
reach. The decision processes of the lesser regional, national, and local
communities in turn affect the distinctive decision processes and value
allocations of the larger community which they comprise. The two differ-
ent kinds of decisions that comprise the global process of effective power,
those that employ arbitrary coercion and violence and those that seek
through authority to minimize such coercion and violence, are obviously
in continuous interaction and struggle. The most comprehensive global
community process thus moves incessantly through a continuum between
two polar extremes; that of the most intense violence and coercion, some-
times described as "war", and that which emphasizes persuasion and
community organized coercion, sometimes described as "peace".
It can be observed, further, that the most comprehensive process of
authoritative decision exhibited in the global community, as in lesser
component communities, is also composed of two different though closely
interrelated types of decision. The first are the constitutive decisions
which establish and maintain a process of authoritative decision. These
are the decisions that identify and characterize decision-makers, postu-
late and specify basic community policies, establish appropriate decision
structures, allocate bases of power for decision and sanctioning purposes,
authorize procedures for the making of different kinds of decisions, and
secure the performance of all the different decision functions (intelli-
gence, promoting, prescribing, invoking, applying, terminating and ap-
praising) necessary for clarifying and securing the more detailed policies
of the larger community. ~ The second type of authoritative decisions are
those that continuously emerge from global constitutive process to estab-
lish and maintain a public order: these are the decisions that determine
how resources are allocated, planned, developed and employed, how
wealth is shaped and distributed, how human rights are promoted and
protected or deprived, how enlightenment is encouraged or blighted, how
health is fostered or neglected, how rectitude and civic responsibility to
the larger community are matured or repressed, and so on through the
whole gamut of demanded values.6 The quality of the constitutive process
that a community can establish tremendously affects the quality of the
public order it can achieve; conversely, the quality of the public order a
community achieves reciprocally affects the quality of the constitutive
process it can establish.
5. The basic features of the existing global constitutive process are described at length
in the references in note 4 above and in McDoUGAL, LASSWELL & CHEN, supra note 2.
6. For an outline of claims for the protection of public order values, see McDoUGAL,
LASSWELL & CHEN, supra note 2, ch. 3.
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The most relevant conception of law in the global community, as in
lesser communities, is, as indicated above, in an ancient tradition revived
by the American Legal Realists, that of a comprehensive process of au-
thoritative decision.7 It is the process, a component of the global process
of effective power, by which the politically relevant members of the larger
community seek to clarify and secure their common interests and to mini-
mize and regulate the assertion of arbitrary, unauthorized violence and
coercion, the other component of the global process of effective power. It
will be observed that, as authoritative decision, the term "law" includes
reference to both authority, in the sense of community expectations about
the requirements of decision, and control, in the sense of actual participa-
tion in the making and enforcement of decision. It may need emphasis
that the most minimal conception of law requires uniformities in decision
in accordance with community expectation; law is the very opposite of the
arbitrary, unauthorized use of violence and coercion. The members of the
global community, as in lesser communities, who are concerned with the
shaping and sharing of values will, further, focus attention, not upon iso-
lated, anecdotal decisions, but upon the whole, comprehensive flow of au-
thoritative decision.
A conception of law, whether for the global community or lesser com-
munities, as a body of rules, though again of ancient origin, is hopelessly
myopic. In pluralistic and rapidly changing communities, rules are always
complementary, ambiguous, and incomplete. They do not apply them-
selves, and technology has yet to invent their automation. The only em-
pirical reference, as faint as it sometimes is, of rules is to decision. For
established decision-makers, and others, the function of rules is to state
community goals and to guide toward the factors in many varying con-
texts that may affect rational choice. Rules are, thus, but one component,
however important, of a comprehensive process of authoritative decision.
The conception of "international law" as a body of rules regulating
the interrelations of nation-states is doubly myopic.8 Beyond the infirmi-
ties of its over-estimating of the potentialities of rules, it has infirmities
in the scope of the activities it seeks to make subject to law. The activi-
ties of humankind in global community process today spill across the
boundaries of nation-states in an ever accelerating and intensifying rate.
The contemporary conception of "transnational law" takes only a begin-
ning account of the importance of individual human beings, and their
multiplicitous associations and groupings, in these new, transnational ac-
7. Lasswell & McDougal, Criteria for a Theory About Law, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 362
(1971). Background is given in W. REISMAN & A. SCHREIBER, JURISPRUDENCE: UNDERSTAND-
ING AND SHAPING LAW (1987).
8. This theme is documented historically in McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, Theories
about International Law: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence, 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 189
(1967).
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tivities.9 A rational concern for peace in either a minimum or optimum
reference, must take these activities into still further account. The law
relevant to peace cannot be confined to the coordination of the activities
of nation-states. An appropriate law extends, must be extended, to the
whole global process of authoritative decision that guides and regulates
human activities across nation-state boundaries. In comprehensive con-
ception this process of decision includes among its component features,
and interrelates, all the various "roads" to peace indicated in the call for
this symposium, such as international governmental organization, third-
party decision-making, the facilitation and protection of diplomacy and
negotiation, conflict resolution, the organization of deterrence, the man-
agement of collective security, and so on.
III. A RELEVANT CONCEPTION OF PEACE
The most relevant conception of peace must make reference to the
least possible application of violence and coercion to the individual
human being and to the freedom of access of the individual to all cher-
ished values. For community members and their decision-makers alike, a
viable conception of peace cannot today be limited to reference to a mere
absence of armed, and international, conflict. The peace demanded by
contemporary humankind is not that of the concentration camp (however
large) or that of the living dead (whatever the community).
The conception of peace, as contraposed to war, in the historic litera-
ture of international law is most imprecise.1o The words "peace" and
"war" are characteristically employed, in high ambiguity, to make simul-
taneous reference both to the presence or absence of the facts of transna-
tional violence and coercion and to the legal consequences to be attached
by authoritative decision to different intensities in violence and coercion.
The facts to which reference is made are those of the global process of
effective power in which many different participants (state and non-
state), for many varying objectives in expansion or conservation, employ
all instruments of policy (military, diplomatic, ideological, and economic),
in alternative stages of acceleration and deceleration in intensity of vio-
lence and coercion, in attack upon the bases of power (people, resources,
institutions) of other participants, and are themselves in turn the targets
of attack. The legal policies and sanctioning consequences that· the au-
thoritative decision-makers of the global community apply to the differ-
ent aspects of this continuous process of violence and coercion vary with
many particular problems, such as the minimization of major coercions,
the conduct of hostilities, the termination of hostilities, the regulation of
minor coercions, and so on. In a first effort to minimize major violence
and coercion, through a law of "aggression" and "self-defense," authorita-
9. P. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956).
10. For comprehensive review, see M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1961) [hereinafter McDOUGAL & FELICIANO).
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tive decision-makers seek to prevent alterations in the existing distribu-
tion of values among nation-states by processes of unilateral and unau-
thorized coercion and to promote value changes and adjustments by
processes of persuasion or by community-sanctioned coercion. A second
effort, when persuasive strategies fail and violence and coercion break
out, is to reduce to a minimum the unnecessary destruction of values by
defining with as much specificity as possible the permissible maximum of
violence and destruction in particular types of situations. It has been
many times documented that our inherited concepts of "peace" and
"war," making such ambiguous reference to this vast maze of facts and
legal policies, cast but a darkening light upon the difficult problems in
public order that presently confront humankind.
It is suggested that a more relevant conception of peace can be found
in a specification of contemporary notions of world public order. A dis-
tinction is sometimes made between "minimum order," in the sense of
the minimization of unauthorized violence and coercion, and "optimum
order," in the sense of the greatest access of the individual human being
to the shaping and sharing of all the values of human dignity.l1 It would
appear, however, that both these kinds of allegedly different public order
goals are indispensable to any workable conception of peace. Even when
conceived in the minimum sense of freedom from the fact and expecta-
tion of arbitrary violence and coercion, peace may be observed increas-
ingly to be dependent upon maintaining people's expectations that the
processes of effective decision in public order will be responsive to their
demands for a reasonable access to all the values we today characterize as
those of human dignity. When peace is more broadly conceived as secur-
ity in position, expectation, and potential with regard to all basic commu-
nity values, the interrelationship of peace and human rights quite obvi-
ously passes beyond that of interdependence and approaches that of
identity. Hence, for reasons of interdependence or identity, there can be
but one answer to President John F. Kennedy's question "Is not peace, in
the last analysis, basically a matter of human rights?"12
The basic community policies that underlie conceptions of peace and
human rights are in any democratic community the same policies that
underlie all law. Hence, it is no metaphor to conclude that peace and law
may appropriately be described as one side of the coin (of community
process and effective power) of which arbitrary violence and coercion are
the other side.
11. McDOUGAL, LASSWELL & CHEN, supra note 2, ch. 5.
12. THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY ISSUES, COMMON SE-
CURITY: A BLUEPRINT FOR SURVIVAL 8 (1982):
A secure existence, free from physical and psychological threats to life and
limb, is one of the most elementary desires of humanity. It is the fundamental
reason why human beings choose to organize nation states, sacrificing certain
individual freedoms for the common good - security. It is a right shared by all -
regardless of where they live, regardless of their ideological or political
convictions.
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The rIsmg, common demands of peoples about the globe for in-
creased protection from arbitrary violence and coercion and for greater
participation in the shaping and sharing of all cherished values are writ-
ten large in contemporary shared consciousness. Yet the expectation of
impending major violence and coercion, employing weapons of apocalyp-
tic destructive potential, continues to hang over the world, threatening
and intimidating all peoples and in measure paralyzing "human rights"
efforts to increase the participation of all individuals in the shaping and
sharing of values. It is this disparity between the demands of the peoples
of the world and responding community achievement that constitutes the
most general problem in shaping a global legal process designed better to
secure peace, whether peace is defined in minimum or optimum terms.
Utopian proponents of peace sometimes ignore that an efforts to im-
prove authoritative decision for better securing peace, however defined,
must take place within the context of the contemporary global process of
effective power. This process of effective power, as we have noted, exhib-
its the major nation-states of the world, and especially those possessing
nuclear weapons and the capabilities for chemical and biological warfare,
engaged in a process of continually balancing power among themselves
and others and taking all measures necessary to insure that no single
state and its allies are able to secure a position of completely dominant,
centralized power. 13 There is no way that peoples cherishing peace and
common interest in all the values of human dignity, can avoid direct con-
frontation with peoples employing violence and coercion for purposes of
expansion in special interest and, when necessary, themselves employing
military force and other coercion in defense of their values. Humankind
has, unhappily, demonstrated down through the millennia that it is some-
times willing to employ the most destructive, unauthorized violence and
coercion against others not merely for self-protection, but to secure de-
manded, though unwanted, changes in the others. The threats and hor-
rors of the contemporary scene need no new depiction or emphasis.
Alleged realists, in contrast, sometimes ignore that authority, as com-
munity expectation, is itself a form of effective power, and a form that
can be changed and improved. A most important base of power for the
decision-makers in any community derives from the expectations of the
members of that community that these are the established decision-mak-
ers and that they are authorized to make certain decisions, by specified
criteria of common interest, and to invoke certain sanctioning conse-
quences to secure compliance. In an age of instantaneous global commu-
nication, this form of effective power, with its appeal to world opinion
and shared conceptions of rectitude, has enormous and increasing
importance.
13. Relevant historical perspectives are delineated in F. HINSLEY, POWER AND THE PUR-
SUIT OF PEACE (1963); C. MURPHY, THE SEARCH FOR WORLD ORDER (1985).
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For perspicuous proponents of peace, the realistic and immediate
challenge is that of introducing into the global process of effective power
more collectivized, perhaps even more centralized, perspectives and oper-
ations of authority, sustained by control. It is not, however, to be as-
sumed that humankind is limited in choice between an anarchy of alleg-
edly equal, independent, and sovereign territorial communities and some
fantasied omnicompetent universal state with all its threats to freedom
and the values of human dignity. The words federal, confederal, region,
alliance, and coalition are primarily meaningful in the present discussion
in their suggestion of the infinite variety of potential modalities in organi-
zation. The parts may be related to the whole in many different, and
changing, ways in a moving context. In the complex contemporary global
community process, there can be no magical modality or gimmick for se-
curing peace.
It is of course necessary in any effort toward improvement, to begin
with the existing global process of authoritative decision, already collec-
tivized in higher degree than many observers are aware. There is urgent
need for reexamination of the competences accorded, in the United Na-
tions and elsewhere, for minimizing resort to major violence and coercion
and for the revision of these competences to make them accord more with
a genuine democracy and the capabilities for responsibility in the enforce-
ment of decisions. One promising alternative requiring consideration, as
we will develop below, is that of enhancing the competence of regional
organization and functional groupings. Many improvements could be
made also in the multitudinous decisions emerging from global constitu-
tive process in regulation of all the public order values other than power,
such as wealth, enlightenment, health, and so on. It is the flow in out-
comes of decision with respect to these values that constitute the subject
matter of human rights and conditions the achievement of peace in both
minimum and maximum conception.
V. THE INADEQUACIES OF EARLY THEORIES AND PROCEDURES
For some centuries the dominant conception of international law has
been, as we are too often reminded, that of a body of rules that regulate
the interrelations of nation-states.14 Grotius, building upon a number of
predecessors, established himself as the founder of modern international
law by recognizing the increasing importance of the nation-state and by
outlining a procedure by which an unorganized community of states
(without centralized legislative, executive, and judicial institutions) could
minimize the occurrence and devastation of major violence and coercion,
through assertions of reciprocity and retaliation. In Grotius' eloquent
14. This history is stated in detail in McDOUGAL, LASSWELL & REISMAN, supra note 8;
see also THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (R. Macdonald & D. John-
stone eds. 1983); see also MORISON, The Schools Reuisited, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. 5 (1983); see also W. SCHIFFER, THE LEGAL COMMUNITY OF MAN-
KIND (1954).
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words "Quod tibi non vis, alteri non facias": what one does not wish done
to himself, he should not do to others.l& This perception of common inter-
est was built upon the fact, dubbed by later French scholars as le
dedoublement fonctionnel, that the same states that are claimants in one
case may be sitting as judges, through world opinion, in the next compa-
rable case. In a community of a large number of states of relatively equal
effective power, even so primitive a procedure could do substantial justice
and maintain a modest peace. Grotius ransacked many versions of natural
law, sacred and profane, and a great range of prior practices by states and
other participants in search of appropriate authoritative rules.
In a recent book, Visions of World Order, the late Julius Stone re-
views the major historic frames of jurisprudence and considers their past
and potential contributions to world public order. IS It is clear from
Stone's presentation, and other surveys, that none of the major frames of
jurisprudence either recognize the degree of collectivization in the con-
temporary global process of authoritative decision or escape from the
shackles of the limited conception of international law as a body of rules
regulating the interrelations of states. In some frames the notion of com-
munity is truncated or imprecise, not permitting either comprehensive or
detailed description. Many conceptions of effective power stop short with
the nation-state as participant, and ignore authority as an important base
of power transnationally. Most frames define authority either in tran-
sempirical (religious or metaphysical) terms or in ambiguous, tautological
syntactic reference, encouraging endless verbal disputations about the
true source of the "obligation" or "binding force" of international law.
Many frames can conceive of control as emanating only from organized
and centralized governmental structures, thus foredooming inquiry at
both international and national levels. The futility of each major, inher-
ited frame may be noted.
The oldest frame of jurisprudence, commonly described as that of
"natural law," deriving from times when religion and notions of physical
nature were often merged with law, did achieve conceptions of a larger
community of humankind and of a common human nature and, hence,
make immense contribution to the development of transnational perspec-
tives of law. The conception of authority propounded by this frame was,
and is, however, characteristically in terms of religious or metaphysical
references, admitting of diametrically opposite interpretations, and, on
the rare occasions when the control dimension of power is addressed, the
conception of control put forward is observable only in appeals from na-
ked power. The frame does not focus squarely upon common interest as a
15. H. Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 23 BRITISH YEAR-
BOOK OF INT'L L. 1 (l943), reprinted in H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW (collected pa-
pers, E. Lauterpacht ed. 1975); T.C. ASSER INSTITUTE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE GROTIAN
HERITAGE 1985 (a commemorative colloquium held at The Hague, 8 April 1983 on the occa-
sion of the Fourth Centenary of the Birth of Hugo Grotius).
16. J. STONE, VISIONS OF WORLD ORDER (l984).
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guide to decision and characteristically makes unverified assumptions
about human nature (social or asocial) and by logical derivations from
such assumptions seeks to establish a body of prescriptions relating to
world public order, including peace. The greatest difficulties for world
public order are created by this frame when assumptions about the na-
ture of individuals are transposed to territorial communities and such en-
tities are believed to have absolute, unmodifiable attributes of equality,
independence, and sovereignty.
The positivist frame, in contrast with natural law, assumes that the
several nation-states constitute the principal communities of humankind
and that whatever transnational community exists, if any, is composed
only of these nation-states. The conception of law propounded by this
frame, in an ill-defined confusion of both authority and control, is in
terms of rules established by nation-state officials, as developed from an
earlier version of the commands of the sovereign. Since the devotees of
this theory can observe no global "sovereign," with centralized legislative,
executive and judicial institutions and officials, their theories by defini-
tion preclude a conception of international law as law. Indeed, the more
bold devotees of this frame flatly assert, in obedience to John Austin's
specifications, that international law is not law. A second version of this
frame, described as "dualist," asserts that, though both national law and
international law are equally law, they have a completely different set of
decision-makers, policies, structures, and procedures. A third version,
known as "monism," finds authority, not in a "sovereign" decision-maker,
but in some postulated global grundnorm, located in either agreement or
custom, and asserts that this grundnorm, by some mysterious deriva-
tional magic, without regard for effective power, dictates the content of
the law both of the larger community and of all its lesser communities. It
will be noted that these two latter versions of the positivist frame both
build upon the assumption that international law is merely a body of
rules that govern the interrelations of states. These rules are to be found,
in theory, largely in the past practices of states. The goofus bird flies
backward because, though it has no care for where it is going, it likes to
know where it has been.
The historical frame, with its emphasis upon the parochial unique-
ness of every particular territorial community, has had great difficulty in
achieving a conception of transnational community. Though this frame
does, in contrast with that of natural law, seek to ground law in empirical
social process, the conception of law with which it commonly works is
that of some mysterious geist or spirit, which supposedly in any particu-
lar community emanates from its people as does their language, religion,
poetry and music. In such an approach, the lines between authority and
control are completely blurred, and few proponents of the approach are
able to isolate authoritative decision or a comprehensive constitutive pro-
cess of decision from the whole flow of particular events in which values
are shaped and shared. The deep and pervasive determinism in the no-
tion that law is somehow forever fixed by an ineluctable fate at some
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point in the past discourages all effort toward innovation and change and
renders sterile the various intellectual tasks indispensable to rational
decision.
Similarly, the sociological frame, despite its characteristic concern for
the scientific study of explanatory factors and social consequences, un-
happily takes its basic conceptions of community and law largely from
the positivist frame. Too often its notion of community process is con-
fined to activities within the nation-state, in neglect of the whole hierar-
chy of interpenetrating community processes from local through national
and regional levels to the global. It commonly finds authority in rules
established by nation-state officials, and even the most realistic propo-
nents of the frame, find control only in organized and centralized institu-
tions. Hence, the conception of international law for this frame continues
to be that of a supposed body of rules governing the interrelations of na-
tion-states, in disregard of the role of other participants in transnational
community and power processes and without clear focus upon authorita-
tive decision transcending state lines. The scientific study in any commu-
nity of the causes and consequences of "rules," without clear relation to
decision, is a difficult task, and can scarcely be expected to contribute
greatly to the maintenance or improvement of world constitutive process
and public order.
The particular policies and procedures developed, under the aegis of
these inherited theories about international law, for the control of major
coercion and violence, sometimes called force, were most primitive. 17
There have, of course, for some centuries been reasonably observed poli-
cies for the protection of diplomats and facilitation of diplomacy; for the
making, application, and termination of international agreements; for the
protection of nationals abroad from abuses by other states; and for the
peaceful settlement of disputes, as through conciliation, mediation, and
arbitration. With respect to the more direct control of major coercions
and violence, the policies and procedures developed were, however, far
from being adequate or consistently observed. The most important effort
to control major coercion and violence, with roots reaching far back into
the Middle Ages, derived from a distinction between just and unjust
wars. 18 The basic thrust of bellum iustum was that resort to major vio-
lence could be regarded as legitimate self-help only for certain objectives,
such as redressing a received wrong, a wrong "serious and commensurate
with the losses the war would occasion" and which could not "be repaired
or avenged in any other way." The effective power of the Papacy made
possible some centralized administration of so general a concept of neces-
sity and consequentiality. Yet even this modest effort to control major
coercion and violence fell before changes in community and effective
17. McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 10, chs. 1 and 3; H. Waldock, The Regulation
of the Use of Force Between States, 81 HAGUE RECUEIL DES COURS, 1952-II, at 455.
18. J. JOHNSON, JUST WAR TRADITION AND THE RESTRAINT OF WAR: A MORAL AND HIS-
TORICAL INQUIRY (1981).
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power processes in the eighteenth century, and by the nineteenth century,
the requirement of bellum iustum was brought to an unobtrusive demise.
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, resort to coercion
came to be regarded as a prerogative of sovereignty, the legitimacy of
which non-participating states were not competent to judge. In the inter-
national law of the time, as Eugene Rostow has written, "war was the
sport of princes and the privilege of states, and could be undertaken for
power, glory, revenge, or many reasons beyond considerations of self-de-
fense."19 International law offered no general prohibition of violence and
made no clear distinction between impermissible and permissible coer-
cion. It attempted only the regulation and the humanitarization of vio-
lence once violence had in fact been initiated. Contending belligerents
were regarded as upon a plane of "juridical equality" and third states
that chose not to participate were said to be under a duty of "neutrality."
In deep paradox, though states were said to have a fundamental right to
independent existence, there was no prohibition against states waging war
and destroying one another. Decisions were to be taken by the relative
strength of states and violence was permissible, not only for self-help and
self-vindication in the conservation of values, but also for effecting
changes in the international distribution of values. In only less paradox, a
few authoritative prescriptions purported to govern the employment of
minor coercions, limited in dimension and objective, sometimes labelled
as "retorsion," "reprisal," "intervention," or "pacific blockade," and so
forth, and generally categorized as "measures short of war." Any such
governance was of course illusory: the initiating state could at any time
designate its operations as "war" and avoid the thrust of limitation.
The movement in the twentieth century toward a general prohibition
of major coercion and violence, and toward a collectivized administration
of that prohibition, is traceable through the Covenant of the League of
Nations, the Pact of Paris, and the Nuremberg verdict, with culmination
in the core provisions of the United Nations Charter.
It requires only brief note that for centuries international law pur-
ported to offer little protection to the citizens of a state against that state.
Traditional law exhausted its concern for human rights with the modest
protection afforded aliens.20
VI. THE CONTEMPORARY AUTHORITATIVE POSTULATION OF BASIC PUBLIC
ORDER GOALS
In 1945, spurred by the "rising, common demands" of individual
human beings from every corner of the globe to be free from "the scourge
of war" and for greater participation in the shaping and sharing of all the
values of human dignity, the framers of the United Nations Charter ef-
19. Rostow, Disputes Involving the Inherent Right of Self- Defense, in THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 264, 283 (L. Damrosch ed. 1987).
20. C. AMERASINGHE, STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS (1967).
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fected two revolutionary changes in historic international law: in core pro-
visions, the Charter postulated, and authoritatively prescribed, both a
general prohibition of the unauthorized employment of major coercion
and violence and a new protection of the fundamental human rights of
individuals, even against their own states.21 In its preambular clauses and
the statement of goals in Article 1, the Charter clearly recognized the inti-
mate interdependence, if not identity, of peace and human rights and
made the protection of human rights coordinate with the maintenance of
peace. In Article 2(3) the Charter prescribed: "All members shall settle
their international disputes by peaceful means in a manner that interna-
tional peace and security, and justice, are not endangered."
The most difficult problem for law in any community, a problem
greatly magnified in the global community by gross inequalities in the
distribution of effective power, is that of characterizing and minimizing
unlawful coercion and violence. In Articles 2(4) and 51, and certain auxil-
iary articles, the United Nations Charter makes an indispensable distinc-
tion between impermissible and permissible coercion and violence and
projects a set of complementary prescriptions, whose unitary and over-
riding policy is that of protecting and promoting peaceful change.
The most important of the new policies, that of a general prohibition
of unauthorized major coercion and violence, is stated very broadly in Ar-
ticle 2(4), which reads: "All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations."
It was, however, recognized that in the still primitively organized
global community, offering only modest expectation of the capability of
the general community for protecting its members, some right of self-de-
fense by states is indispensable to the maintenance of even the most
modest minimum order. Hence, Article 51 of the Charter reads: "Nothing
in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary
to maintain international peace and security ...."
The historic right of states to sel(defense did not require them, like
sitting ducks, to await armed attack, and it is clear, despite occasional
literalist interpretations, that the framers of the Charter had no intent to
preclude response to imminent attack and to impose suicide. The most
rational construction of these complementary policies contraposed in Ar-
ticles 2(4) and 51 would appear to be: the right of self-defense established
by the Charter, as in traditional practice, authorizes a state which, being
the target of activities by another state, reasonably decides, as third-party
observers may later determine reasonableness, that such activities require
21. The first of these developments is described in McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note
10, ch. 3; the second in McDOUGAL, LASSWELL & CHEN, supra note 2, ch. 4.
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it to employ the military instrument to protect its territorial integrity and
political independence, to use such force as may be necessary and propor-
tionate to its defense.22 The employment of force that creates this expec-
tation in a target state is in violation of Article 2(4) and is commonly
characterized as "aggression," the unlawful complement to lawful self-
defense.
Learning from the obvious difficulties in Grotius' dedoublement
fonctionnel and the failures of the League of Nations, the framers of the
Charter projected, for the detailed administration of this basic distinction
between impermissible and permissible coercion and violence, a highly
collectivized and centralized structure of decision-making. Thus, in Arti-
cle 24(1) the Security Council, with its veto for the protection of perma-
nent members, was accorded "primary responsibility for the maintenance
of international peace and security," and the members agreed that the
Security Council, "in carrying out its duties under this responsibility,"
acted on their behalf. In other chapters of the Charter, elaborate provi-
sion was made both for the peaceful settlement of disputes and for em-
ployment of organized community force in the maintenance of public or-
der. In Article 39 the Security Council was authorized to "determine the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggres-
sion" and to recommend or take appropriate measures "to maintain or
restore international peace and security." In other articles possible mea-
sures, of varying intensity in coercion, are outlined in detail. The cap-
stone Article 25 provides: "The Members of the United Nations agree to
accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance
with the present Charter."
The United Nations Charter, despite all its emphasis upon the im-
portance of (and modest prescription about) human rights, does not itself
project a comprehensive and detailed bill of human rights. This gap in
constitutive prescription has, however, been remedied by a sequence of
cumulative subsequent developments. Building upon the provisions of the
Charter, the main features of a comprehensive global bill of rights have
been prescribed, if not yet effectively applied, through a whole host of
authoritative communications, including The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (now largely customary law); The Covenant on Political
and Civil Rights; The Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;
The Genocide Convention; and multiple specialized and regional pacts; as
well as by national constitutions and the vast flow of judicial and other
decisions that create the expectations of customary law. The outcome is,
thus, an authoritatively prescribed global bill of human rights entirely
comparable in content and reach to that maintained in contemporary,
more. mature national communities.23 It embraces the fundamental poli-
cies that underlie all law in any community that seeks a genuine clarifica-
22. The detailed application of this test is outlined in McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra
note 10, ch. 3.
23. This thesis is documented in McDOUGAL, LASSWELL & CHEN, supra note 2, ch. 4.
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tion of the common interests of its members. A world public order of
human dignity may endure many variations in the practices by which
particular values are shaped and shared if major value goals are kept
compatible and all practices are evaluated and accommodated by the cri-
teria of common interest.
VII. TRENDS IN PAST ACHIEVEMENT OF BASIC GOALS
It is common knowledge that the highly collectivized and centralized
structure of decisionmaking projected by the United Nations Charter for
characterizing and minimizing major coercion and violence was stillborn.
So complex an administrative structure, requiring the careful coordina-
tion of member states, could not survive the vast disparities in the effec-
tive power and interests of member states and the mounting intensity of
the struggle between an expansive totalitarian public order and an oppos-
ing order at least aspiring toward the values of human dignity. As the
horrors of worldwide war have receded, the perception and clarification of
a common interest between the contending orders has become more and
more difficult.
In consequence of this failure of the projected centralized structure
of decisionmaking, the larger community of humankind has been thrown
back, for making the difficult distinction between impermissible and per-
missible coercion and violence, upon Grotius' ancient dedoublement fonc-
tionnel, in which the several states themselves make the necessary evalu-
ations and undertake appropriate sanctioning measures. In such a context
it cannot be surprising that states commonly make the evaluations in
terms of their own special interests, including the interests of the public
order to which they adhere. It is not believed, however, that the great
bulk of humankind, taken as individuals, have abandoned their demand
to be free from the "scourge of war," or have lost the realistic expectation
that some stable, uniform administration of the distinction between im-
permissible and permissible coercion and violence is indispensable to
even minimum attainment of a law-governed global community. The
states of the world, and the 'whole of humankind as expressed through the
many media of world public opinion, do continue to challenge and evalu-
ate the behavior of states by the criteria of Articles 2(4) and 51. The hope
would appear to remain that more centralized and more effective proce-
dures for the administration of an indispensable policy can still be
achieved. In the light of such expectations and hope, it can scarcely be
said, with realism, that Articles 2(4) and 51 are dead and that humankind
is again without authoritative prohibition of major coercion and vio-
lence. 24 At least for the proponents of a public order of human dignity,
the understanding remains that the application of major coercion and vi-
olence to the human person is fundamentally incompatible with basic
24. The question is raised by T. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? or: Changing Norms
Governing the Use of Force by States, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809 (1970).
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human rights and that a global community that genuinely aspires toward
the values of human dignity must continue to seek to minimize major
coercion and violence as an instrument of change, or as an instrument
obstructing peaceful change.
A principal obstacle to the uniform application of Articles 2(4) and
51 has been in the insistence, from the beginning, by the Soviet Union
that "wars of liberation" are not subject to Article 2(4). This concept,
designed to facilitate totalitarian expansionism, is derived from an earlier
idiosyncratic distinction between "just" and "unjust" wars. The distinc-
tion reads:
(a) Just wars, wars that are not wars of conquest but wars of libera-
tion, waged to defend the people from foreign attack and from at-
tempts to enslave them, or to liberate the people from capitalist slav-
ery, or, lastly, to liberate colonies and dependent countries from the
yoke of imperialism; and
(b) Unjust wars, wars of conquest, waged to conquer and enslave for-
eign countries and foreign nations.26
In more modern formulation the concept and its justification are thus
stated by Professor Tunkin:
Modern international law also provides for the right of colonial peo-
ples and dependent countries to use armed force against metropolies
interfering with efforts of the peoples of corresponding countries or
territories to realize their right to self-determination. Such use of
armed force is also a justified form of self-defence. While in a general
form that proposition follows from the United Nations Charter itself,
it finds more concrete expression in numerous international docu-
ments, including the Geneva agreements of 1954 concerning Indo-
china, and numerous resolutions of the United Nations General As-
sembly, especially in the Declaration on Principles of International
Law of 1970.28
This alleged exception to Article 2(4) has, as is well known, been em-
ployed by the Soviets to justify interventions in many countries in Eu-
rope, Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
In supplement to this alleged exception from Article 2(4) of "wars of
liberation," the Soviets have in relatively recent times sought to establish
an allied exception known as the "Brezhnev Doctrine." This doctrine is
designed to justify Soviet intervention in states already "socialist" to pre-
clude their choice to become other than socialist. In its most authoritative
statement, this doctrine reads:
There is no doubt that the peoples of the socialist countries and the
Communist Parties have and must have freedom to determine their
25. History of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Short Course 167-168 (Commission
of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) ed. 1939), as quoted in McDOUGAL & FELICI-
ANO, supra note 10, at 186.
26. G. TUNKIN, LAW AND FORCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 85 (1983).
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country's path of development. However, any decision of theirs must
damage neither socialism in their own country nor the fundamental
interests of the other socialist countries nor the worldwide workers'
movement, which is waging a struggle for socialism. This means that
every Communist Party is responsible not only to its own people but
also to all the socialist countries and to the entire Communist move-
ment. Whoever forgets this in placing sole emphasis on the autonomy
and independence of Communist Parties lapses into one-sidedness,
shirking his internationalist obligations.27
The statement adds:
Each Communist Party is free in applying the principles of Marxism-
Leninism and socialism in its own country, but it cannot deviate from
these principles (if, of course, it remains a Communist Party). In con-
crete terms this means primarily that every Communist Party cannot
fail to take into account in its activities such a decisive fact of our
time as the struggle between the two antithetical social systems -
capitalism and socialism.28
The violence with which this doctrine has been, and is being, applied in
Eastern Europe and elsewhere needs no new description. The totality of
these claims for exception from Article 2(4), through both wars of libera-
tion and the Brezhnev Doctrine that the Soviet Union asserts is aptly
summarized by Professor Michael Reisman:
The Soviet claim was and continues to be that, the U.N. Charter not-
withstanding, the Soviet Union maintains the right to support those
struggling against existing governments if their struggle is consistent
with historical laws, of which the Soviet government is the exclusively
authorized interpreter. If the groups succeed, the Soviet Union has
the additional right and obligation to make sure that their members
and constituents do not change their minds in the future. A scholar of
no less stature than Professor Tunkin has sanctified the doctrine as a
jus cogens.28
Incredibly enough, the International Court of Justice in the recent
Nicaragua case would appear, perhaps maladroitly, to have conferred its
authority upon "wars of liberation."3D At one point in its opinion, the
27. Kovalev, Sovereignty and the International Obligations of Socialist Countries,
Pravda, September 26, 1968, quoted in McDoUGAL & REISMAN, supra note 4, at 176.
28. Id. See also Rostow, Law and the Use of Force by States: The Brezhnev Doctrine,
7 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORO. 209 (1981).
29. Reisman, Old Wine in New Bottles: The Reagan and Brezhnev Doctrines in Con-
temporary International Law and Practice, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 171, 188 (1988).
A possible change in Soviet attitudes toward both "wars of liberation" and the
Brezhnev Doctrine is indicated in M. Gorbachev, Reality and Safeguards for a Secure
World, Sept. 17, 1987, U.N. Doc. A/42/574, S/194143 (Sept. 18, 1987). Unhappily, there
would appear to be some dissension in the ranks. See Gorbachev Deputy Criticizes Policy,
New York Times, Aug. 7, 1988, at 11, col. 1. Even Mr. Gorbachev himself sometimes wavers.
See Dissenters Stay Silent, The Times (London), July 15, 1988, at 6, col. 6. The changes
under way would appear to be in the direction of greatly improved world public order.
30. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
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Court in piety, as excessive as impossible, declares its complete neutrality
between contending systems of world public order. It writes:
The finding of the United States Congress also expressed the view
that the Nicaraguan Government has taken "significant steps towards
establishing a totalitarian Communist dictatorship." However the re-
gime in Nicaragua be defined, adherence by a State to any particular
doctrine does not constitute a violation of customary international
law; to hold otherwise would make nonsense of the fundamental prin-
ciple of State sovereignty, on which the whole of international law
rests, and the freedom of choice of the political, social, economic and
cultural systems of a State. Consequently, Nicaragua's domestic policy
options, even assuming that they correspond to the description given
of them by the Congress finding, cannot justify on the legal plane the
various actions of the Respondent complained of. The Court cannot
contemplate the creation of a new rule opening up a right of interven-
tion by one State against another on the ground that the latter has
opted for some particular ideology or political system.31
Yet in its holding the Court finds in the acknowledged hostilities of Nica-
ragua against EI Salvador no "armed attack" against EI Salvador or even
threat of "armed attack" against EI Salvador or any other state; hence, it
denies the United States the right to participate in the collective defence
of EI Salvador and legitimizes the factual intervention by Nicaragua. As
Judge Schwebel writes, in dissent, this was in substance to honor "wars of
liberation."32 Judge Schwebel, finding the errors of the Court conspicu-
ous, writes:
The Court appears to reason this way. Efforts by State A (however
insidious, sustained, substantial and effective), to overthrow the gov-
ernment of State B, if they are not or do not amount to an armed
attack upon State B, give rise to no right of self-defence by State B,
and hence, to no right of State C to join State B in measures of collec-
tive self-defence. State B, the victim State, is entitled to take counter-
measures against State A, of a dimension the Court does not specify.
But State C is not thereby justified in taking counter-measures
against State A which involve the use of force. 33
He adds confirmation of his interpretation by noting a negative inference
from an earlier reference by the Court to "wars of decolonization," a kind
of war not involved in the case. Thus, while professing not to be able to
create a double standard, by its decision the Court in fact creates a
double standard in favor of an expansive totalitarianism.34 The question
before the Court was not whether Nicaragua's choice of a public order
was "a violation of customary international law," but whether Nicaragua's
attacks upon its neighbors were in accord with conventional and custom-
(Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14.
31. Id., para. 263.
32. Dissenting Opinion, para. 174-81.
33. Id., para. 175.
34. Id., para. 178, referring to paragraph 206 of the Judgment of the Court.
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ary international law.3~
The decision and opinion of the International Court of Justice in the
Nicaragua case, most unhappily, raises grave questions about the capabil-
ities of a judicial body, under the contemporary circumstances of con-
tending world public orders, to make rational decisions in the common
interest about the regulation of major coercion and violence. At the juris-
dictional phase of the case,36 the Court held, contrary to all prior law,
that it had jurisdiction over a state that had not consented to such juris-
diction, and in favor of a state that had no standing to sue except by the
most factitious creation of the Court. At the merits phase, the Court
demonstrated that it had few capabilities for discovering or recognizing
the facts relevant to rational decision, and even less capabilities for evalu-
ating such facts by the criteria that much of the world regards as ex-
pressed in the United Nations Charter and customary internationallaw.37
Hersch Lauterpacht could have been right in his famous insistence that
in the abstract no dispute between human beings is inherently non-justi-
ciable.3s His conclusion can, however, have little relevance to a struggle
between contending world public orders in which all common interest,
beyond bare· human survival, seems at times to have disappeared.39
It should be no cause for wonder, in an infectious deterioration of
policies and procedures for the regulation of major coercion and violence,
that the United States, as a principal proponent of a public order of
human dignity, should begin in measure, for self-help, to adopt policies
35. My criticism of the Court is both of its holding that an actual "armed attack" by
Nicaragua upon El Salvador was necessary before the United States could come to the aid
of El Salvador and of its finding that what Nicaragua was doing did not amount to an
armed attack upon El Salvador. In the light of this holding and this finding, it does not
matter that the Court did not explicitly state that it regarded "wars of liberation" as lawful;
by its decision it honored such an expansionist war in fact.
36. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) Ju-
risdiction and Admissibility, 1984 LC.J. 392.
It should perhaps be noted that the writer was of counsel to the United States Govern-
ment at this phase of the case.
37. See Norton, The Nicaragua Case: Political Questions before the International
Court of Justice, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 459 (1987); J. MOORE, THE SECRET WAR IN CENTRAL
AMERICA (1987); R. TURNER, NICARAGUA V. UNITED STATES: A LOOK AT THE FACTS (1987).
The decision is discussed, in varying terms of approval and disapproval, in a sequence
of comments in Appraisals of the ICJ's Decision: Nicaragua v. United States (Merits), 81
AM. J. INT'L L. 77 (1987). A particularly perceptive comment is that of J. Hargrove, The
Nicaragua Judgment and the Future of the Law of Force and Self-Defense, 81 AM. J. INT'L
L. 135 (1987).
See also H. Almond, Jr., The Military Activities Case: New Perspectives on the Inter-
national Court of Justice and Global Public Order, 21 INT'L LAW. 195 (1987); Macdonald,
The Nicaraguan Case: New Answers to Old Questions, 1986 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 127; Turner,
Peace and the World Court: A Comment on the Paramilitary Activities Case, 20 VAND. J.
TRANSN'L L. 53 (1987).
38. H. LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (1933).
39. McDougal & Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of
Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1959).
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and procedures parallel to those employed by the Soviet Union. Through
the Monroe Doctrine and participation in the Organization of American
States the United States has long of course sought to preclude outside
states from acquiring territorial power in the Western hemisphere. More
recently, Presidents as diverse in general perspective as Kennedy and
Johnson have made pronouncements, in content comparable to the later
Brezhnev Doctrine, designed to justify interventions against totalitarian
expansion into this hemisphere!O Even the House of Representatives
joined in support of these pronouncements. It resolved that:
(1) any [international communist] subversive domination or threat of
it violates the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, and of collective se-
curity as set forth in the acts and resolutions heretofore adopted by
the American Republics; and
(2) in any such situation anyone or more of the high contracting par-
ties to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance may, in the
exercise of individual or collective self-defense, which could go so far
as resort to armed force, and in accordance with the declarations and
principles above stated, take steps to forestall or combat intervention,
domination, control and colonization of whatever form, by the subver-
sive forces known as international communism and its agencies in the
Western hemisphere."
In contemporary times Presidents Carter and Reagan have extended
comparable doctrines to the Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabia.
Another important obstacle to the rational, uniform application of
Articles 2(4) and 51 derives from the attempt, as illustrated by the Inter-
national Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case, to cut down the reach of
the historic right of self-defense.42 It is not always recognized that in the
global community Articles 2(4) and 51 are as wholly complementary as
are the prohibition of violence and the permission of self-defense in ma-
ture national communities. Some state officials and scholars have taken
the position that Article 51 imposes upon states a higher degree of neces-
sity than that of customary international law and requires states to await
the inception of actual armed attack, without option to respond to realis-
tic expectations of imminent attack. This interpretation of Article 51 is
based upon an allegedly literal interpretation of the words "armed at-
tack" regarded as an isolated component of the article. It may be noted,
however, that such interpretation introduces the words "only if' into the
Article and is contrary to all the important canons for the interpretation
of international agreements.H The negotiating record indicates that the
framers of the Charter sought only, by introducing the words "armed at-
40. The various pronouncements of United States officials are summarized in Reisman,
supra note 29.
41. As quoted in Reisman, supra note 29, at 177.
42. Rostow, supra note 19; O. Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the Use
of Force, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 113 (1986).
43. This position is fully developed in McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 10, at 217,
232.
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tack," to immunize regional security arrangements, and especially the In-
ter-American system envisioned by the Act of Chapullepec, from the ju-
risdiction of the Security Council. There was no expressed intent to
forbid response to threat of imminent attack. The most relevant Commit-
tee Report reads: "The use of arms in legitimate self-defense remains ad-
mitted and unimpaired."" The principle of interpretation by the subse-
quent conduct of states obviously can give little comfort to those who
urge new limitations. Most importantly, the principle of effectiveness in
interpretation by major purposes makes the asserted limitation of self-
defense to the actual inception of armed attack an absurdity. In an age of
increasingly awesome instruments of destruction and highly sophisticated
coercion by instruments other than the military, the state that awaits
armed attack, can expect only quick transition to oblivion. It defies not
merely major purposes, but even common sense, to think that a prescrip-
tion in effect imposing suicide could either create the expectation, indis-
pensable to law, of its enforcement, or that it could be enforced.
It may be recalled that the United Nations Charter makes the pro-
tection of human rights coordinate with, if not inclusive of, its prohibition
of unauthorized coercion and violence. It is presently being greatly de-
bated among scholars and others in what degree the core provisions about
human rights are, like the provision for self-defense in Article 51, com-
pletely complementary with Article 2(4).'& Most observers agree that the
long enjoyed practice of humanitarian intervention, for the protection of
a state's nationals and sometimes others, has not been outlawed by Arti-
cle 2(4). It would thwart reason to hold that a constitutional Charter so
greatly emphasizing human rights should be interpreted to abolish an his-
toric remedy so effective in the protection of human rights, a remedy
which does not in fact threaten territorial integrity and political
independence.
The more intense contemporary controversy centers most directly
upon whether it is lawful for one state to interfere (engage or assist in
coercion and violence) in the internal affairs of another state for a range
of objectives. Unhappily, the discussion is carried on in terms, such as
"intervention," "counter-intervention," "civil war," "self-determination,"
"spheres of influence," "reprisals," "retaliations," and so on, which make
so ambiguous a reference to both facts and legal policies that it is often
difficult to know what is being asserted. One suggestion appears to be
44. McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 10, at 236.
45. See, inter alia, Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter
Article 2(4), 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 642 (1984); The Use of Force in Contemporary International
Law, 78 PROC. AM. SOc'v INT'L L. 74 (1984); Criteria for the Lawful Use of Force in Inter-
national Law, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 279 (1985); The Emperor Has No Clothes: Article 2(4)
and the Use of Force in Contemporary International Law, ch. 1 in UNITED NATIONS FOR A
BETTER WORLD (J. Saxena and others, eds. 1986) 3; Schachter, The Legality of Pro-Demo-
cratic Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 645 (1984); The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82
MICH. L. REV. 1620 (1984); International Law in Theory and Practice, 178 RECUEIL DES
COURS, 1982-V, ch. VII, VIII; Cutler, The Right to Intervene, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 96 (1985).
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that the self-determination of states is the paramount policy of contem-
porary international law and that the proponents of human dignity may
intervene in other states to protect or promote self-determination, even as
totalitarian states do in promotion of totalitarian public order. In re-
sponse other commentators, not always taking a position upon the Soviet
claims, insist that such intervention would be in clear violation of the
allegedly literal and neutral words of Article 2(4). A counter-response is
that the proponents of human dignity may lawfully intervene after, but
not before, expansive totalitarians have intervened in a state. In such
controversy it is sometimes forgotten that what is involved in all in-
stances is the application of the larger community's fundamental policy,
as embodied in Articles 2(4) and 51, against change by coercion and vio-
lence and that the objectives of a state, whether for expansion or conser-
vation, are among the most important features of the factual context for
evaluating the lawfulness or unlawfulness of a state's action.
It has long been urged that the rational application of Articles 2(4)
and 51, in clarification of common interest, requires in every instance of
challenged coercion and violence, not mere logical derivation from alleg-
edly autonomous (policy neutral) rules, but rather a careful, configurative
examination and appraisal of the many relevant features of the larger
context of the coercion and violence!6 In an earlier statement, noting that
the relevant features of the context in any instance of challenged coercion
and violence were many and complex, we summarized:
Even the most modest suggestion must include the varying character-
istics of the participants, and of their allies and affiliates; the distribu-
tion of perspectives of attack and defense, expansion and conserva-
tion, deliberateness and coincidence, inclusivity and exclusivity,
consequentiality and inconsequentiality; the locus of events, as within
a single community or transcending different communities, and the
geographic range of the impacts of events; the timing of events, and
their continuity or discontinuity; the differential distribution of the
bases of effective power; the variety and characteristics of the differ-
ent strategies - diplomatic, ideological, economic, and military -
employed; and the various outcomes in intensity and magnitude
achieved, of the fact, and expectation, of coercion and destruction of
values.· 7
46. This position is believed to be established in McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note
10, ch. 3.
47. McDougal, Foreword to J. MOORE, LAW AND THE INDO-CHINA WAR (1972).
For example, in relevant prescription the customary right to use force in self-defense is
limited by the criterion of necessity to defend against an imminent, or exercised, use of
force against the territorial integrity of a state or its political independence, and by the
requirement of proportionality of the action taken in self-defense. Thus, the action de-
fended against has to be appraised in its entire context: the participants have to be deter-
mined, their objectives (e.g., whether they are expansionist or conservative in nature), the
situation of decision, the bases of power behind the activities, the strategies employed, and
their immediate outcomes in intensities of coercion. If the activities complained of would
lead a disinterested third party to reasonably conclude that use of the military instrument is
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It is no revolutionary idea, alien to the common interest that must be
effected by all law, that the kind of public order demanded by a state be
taken into account in appraising the lawfulness of its acts of coercion and
violence. In endorsing this idea, more than twenty-five years ago, Floren-
tino Feliciano and I wrote:
Lest the contrary impression arise by default, it may be made clear
that, in contrast with the quoted Soviet doctrine, we make no propo-
sal for incorporation of a double or multiple standard in the concep-
tion of permissible coercion. The policy we recommend is, on the con-
trary, that of demand for effective universality, for the uniform
application to all participants of a basic policy that excludes the ac-
quisition or expansion of values by coercion and violence. In urging
the explicit examination of the fundamental public order perspectives
of participants, in particular their definitions of the legitimate pur-
poses of coercion, the hope is precisely that decision-makers may
thereby escape the double standard which in specific interpretations
may be created against those who do not accept as permissible the use
of coercion for expansion. We think of the interest to be clarified, the
demand for change by noncoercive and nonviolent procedures only, as
a general community interest, as the long-term interest of all individ-
ual states, and recognize that there must be a promise of reciprocity
from states who reject totalitarian conceptions of world order.·s
What the proponents of a public order of human dignity cannot ac-
cept is that a double standard be established that discriminates in favor
of expansive totalitarianism.
VIII. THE CONDITIONS AFFECTING ACHIEVEMENT OF BASIC GOALS
By considering the conditions that have affected past failures in hu-
mankind's achievement of a stable minimum public order; an observer
may be able to feed back to the clarification of goals, enhance under-
standing of past trends, and prepare for the projection of probable fu-
tures and a more rational choice among policy options. The conditions
that have affected past failures are commonly described, at high level ab-
straction, in terms, first, of the contemporary anarchy of multitudinous
states, exhibiting both a most uneconomic relation of peoples to resources
and immense differences in effective power, and secondly, of the continu-
ing struggles between contending systems of world public order, expres-
urgently required to protect the target country's territorial integrity and political indepen-
dence, then the target country may employ force in a reasonably proportionate response -
the proportionality of the defensive action, again, being determined through comprehensive
contextual analysis.
Such a contextual examination of the events in the Nicaragua case would reveal the
Soviet Union and Cuba as participants along with the Sandinistas and would note the ex-
pansionist nature of their objectives. For an outline of the necessary examination and ap-
praisal in a comparable case, see M. McDougal, The Souiet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-
Defense, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 597 (1963).
48. McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 10, at 187 n.156.
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sing diametrically opposed conceptions of the relation of the individual
human being to the state. To make this high level description of overrid-
ing conditions meaningful, however, it must be given operational indices
in terms of a maze of interacting predispositional and environmental vari-
ables"9 The predispositional variables are the subjectivities of individual
human beings, including their demands for values, their identifications
with others, and their expectations about the context of interaction; these
relevant subjectivities may be organized by employment of the maximiza-
tion postulate, that individuals adopt one response rather than another
when they expect to be better off in terms of all their values by the re-
sponse chosen. The environmental variables are the features of the larger
community context, which both condition and constrain predispositions.
These environmental variables may economically be described in terms of
population, resources, institutions, and outcomes in value shaping and
sharing. A most convenient way of achieving comprehensive description
of any community process, it may be recalled, is in terms of individual
human beings, with varying patterns of demand, identification and expec-
tation, employing resources, through institutional practices, for max-
imization of value outcomes.
It has already been noted that a most important variable in the con-
temporary global process of effective power is what is commonly referred
to as "the rising, common demands" of peoples for greater participation
in the shaping and sharing of all the basic values of human dignity. Dif-
ferent peoples, conditioned by differing cultural traditions and modes of
social organization, may of course pursue and achieve the same basic val-
ues through different modalities and nuances in institutional practice.
Unhappily, in a world of contending public orders and immense contrasts
in development, peoples nurtured in differing parochial communities may
tend to express special, rather than common, interests. Unable to clarify
and 'agree upon common interests, peoples often become preoccupied with
short-term, immediate payoffs rather than long-term consequences. It is
possible that as the respect revolution accelerates, people's demands for
new participation in the different value processes will become more realis-
tic in recognition of the need for reciprocity and common interest. The
universalizing demands of individuals for greater participation in all value
processes can be expected to continue to affect all effective and authorita-
tive decision.
The identifications upon behalf of which demands for values are as-
serted today range from the whole of humankind to small parochial
groups. The earliest parochial identifications with the family and the
tribe were broken, in part, by the advent of cities, facilitating the later
identifications with larger states. In more recent times, the "nation-state"
has been the symbol about which individuals could organize their collec-
49. These variables are outlined and described in some detail in McDOUGAL, LASSWELL
& CHEN, supra note 2, at ch. 1.
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tive identifications, and most states have of course sought to inhibit more
inclusive identifications that might limit their power. It would appear,
however, that the potentialities for individuals to acquire and sustain
more inclusive identifications, at least for the promotion of minimum or-
der, are strengthening. The increasing tempo of interaction in all value
processes around the globe, facilitated by modern communication and
transportation, allows an individual not merely to change geographic loca-
tion, but also to change "place" through identifications with many differ-
ent functional groups. Individuals who participate in a vast global net-
work of territorial and functional activities may be able better to identify
with a common humanity and to demand its common interest.
The expectations of the peoples of the world about the conditions
that affect minimum public order and their individual security, the ex-
pectations that in turn affect all effective and authoritative decision, vary
tremendously in comprehensiveness and realism. The greatest contempo-
rary failure in realism is in the lack of appreciation of the comprehensive-
ness and depth of the interdependences, affecting bo'th minimum and op-
timum order, of all peoples everywhere with regard to the shaping and
sharing of all values. No less importantly, in a world in which the giant
powers continuously balance weapons capable of instantaneous global de-
struction, most peoples, elite and rank and file alike, are obsessed by a
pervasive expectation of violence that affects all choices among alterna-
tives in value shaping and sharing. Fortunately, the spread of new tech-
niques of communication and modern education make it possible for indi-
viduals everywhere to acquire a new realism about the conditions, not
merely of continued existence, but of improved public order. As the net-
work or interaction and the perception of interdependence expand, more
and more peoples may come to perceive that the assertion of special in-
terest, against common interest, is not compatible with survival. Some of
the more important environmental variables that characterize the con-
temporary global community process, affecting all public order, may be
indicated in the following tabular, if somewhat anecdotal, form:oo
1. Security
Continuing confrontations of the major powers, with rising expecta-
tions of violence. Threats of nuclear destruction and of chemical and
biological warfare. The acquisition of contemporary instruments of
destruction by smaller powers. The rise and spread of private violence
and terrorism.
2. Population
The accelerating rate of increase in population growth. The uneven
distribution of peoples in relation to resources and i!,\creasing barriers
to migration.
50. This presentation is adapted from McDougal, International Law and the Future,
50 MISS. L. J. 259 (979).
HeinOnline -- 18 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 26 1989-1990
26 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'y VOL. 18:1
3. Resources
The spoilation, pollution, and exhaustion of resources at an accelerat-
ing rate. Increasing violation of physical and engineering unities in the
use of resources. The growing monopolization of sharable resources,
with restraint upon scientific inquiry about resources. The promise
and threat of both deliberate and accidental climate and weather
modification. The- continuing diversion of important resources to de-
structive purposes.
4. Institutions
The antiquated nation-state structures, with their disregard of physi-
cal, engineering, and utilization uhities. The continuing weakness of
international governmental organizations. The lack of development of
functional transnational associations devoted to values other than
power and wealth. The relative immunization of wealth and other pri-
vate associations from transnational authority.
5. Particular Value Processes Within Global Community Process
(1) Power
The retreat of democracy and rise of totalitarianism within many dif-
ferent communities. The increasing centralization, concentration, and
bureaucratization of power even within nominally democratic commu-
nities. The increasing monopolization of the effective bases of power
within different communities.
(2) Wealth
The continued prevalence of individual poverty. Unequal distribution
of wealth both within and across community lines. Inadequate regula-
tion of transnational monetary units. Governmental interferences with
private trade. Arbitrary seizures and confiscations of property rights.
Irrational allocations of resources and unequal development. Continu-
ing cycles of depression and inflation.
(3) Respect
Widespread denials of individual freedom of choice about social roles.
Increasing individual differentiations and group hatreds upon grounds
(race, sex, religion, language, national origin) irrelevant to individual
capabilities and contributions. Massive encroachments upon individ-
ual autonomy and privacy through modern technology and increasing
governmental bureaucratization.
(4) Well-Being (Health)
Continuing high mortality rate and low life expectancy in many parts
of the world. Increasing threats of famine, epidemics, and disease. In-
discriminate mass killings in armed conflict and other interactions.
Unexplained disappearances. The globalization of the practice of tor-
ture as a deliberate instrument of policy.
(5) Enlightenment
Continuing high J'ates of illiteracy and differential access to informa-
tion in many communities. Deliberate fabrications and disseminations
of misinformation. Wholesale indoctrinations and brainwashings. The
withholding and suppression of the information necessary to indepen-
dent appraisals of policy.
(6) Skill
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The unequal distribution of skills in modern technology and the rapid
obsolescence of skills by changes in technology. The brain drain from
the developing countries to the developed. Restrictions upon the free-
doms of skill groups to organize and to function.
(7) Affection (Loyalties)
The requisition of loyalties in the name of the state and the under-
mining of more universal loyalties. Severe restrictions upon freedom
of association. Governmental frustration of congenial personal rela-
tions and employment of social ostracism as sanctions.
(8) Rectitude
Denials of freedom to worship and choose secular criteria of responsi-
bility. The politicization of rectitude. Restrictions upon association for
religious purposes and intolerance and persecution of religious minori-
ties. The rise of messianic religious fundamentalism.
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The intense interdependences among all the predispositional and en-
vironmental conditions make it possible to effect changes in the larger
global community process, including movement toward a more stable
minimum public order, by making changes in, and managing, the various
particular conditions.
IX. POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
Law is interested in the past and the present in aid of inventing and
making the future. Even in relation to a problem as difficult as that of
establishing and maintaining a stable minimum world public order, the
projection of possible futures, when inspired and disciplined by knowl-
edge of past trends in achievement and their conditioning factors, may
serve to stimulate creativity in the invention and evaluation of improved
alternatives in decision. One procedure for inquiry about the future, in-
vented by the late Harold Lasswell some fifty years ago, is that of deliber-
ately formulating provisional maps of "developmental constructs" of fu-
ture possibilities that range through a broad spectrum from the most
optimistic to the most pessimistic.lil When this method of inquiry is ap-
plied to the problem of minimum world public order, the contrast in rival
constructs is stark.
The most optimistic construct projects increasing progress toward a
wider and more responsible sharing of power and a greater production
and wider sharing in all the values of human dignity among the peoples
of the world. This construct builds upon various assumptions about
predispositional and environmental variables and their interaction. It
projects, thus, that the widespread demands of peoples for a greater and
more rewarding participation in all value processes will not diminish, but
will rather intensify, that the contemporary and largely parochial identifi-
51. H. LASSWELL, WORLD POLITICS AND PERSONAL INSECURITY (1935); THE WORLD
REVOLUTION OF OUR TIME: A FRAMEWORK FOR BASIC POLICY RESEARCH (1951). See also Eu-
lau, H. D. Lasswell's Developmental Analysis, XI W. POL. Q. 229 (1958); W. ASCHER, FORE-
CASTING: AN ApPRAISAL FOR POLIcy-MAKERS AND PLANNERS (1978).
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cations of peoples may, despite recurrent phases of fragmentation, ex-
pand toward recognition, not merely of common humanity, but of shared
community, and that peoples will achieve increasingly realistic perception
of, and expectations about, their indissoluble interdependences in relation
to the shaping and sharing of all values. This construct, considering envi-
ronmental variables, projects assumptions that the accelerating rate of
population growth can be controlled, that the resource-environment of
the world can be protected from exhaustion and spoilation, that science
and science-based technology can create vast new resources, and that
more economic governmental and value-functional institutions can be
created, and so on.
The most pessimistic construct regards the direction of history as re-
versing itself and moving toward an aggregate of militarized and gar-
risoned communities, controlled from the center and modelled on the
prison. This trend could culminate in an all comprehensive, single totali-
tarian state, with a system of public order that, when finally entrenched,
organizes the global community into a vast hierarchical pattern under the
rule of a self-perpetuating military caste. This construct builds upon the
assumptions, among predispositional variables, that the peoples of the
world will not be able to clarify their genuine common interests, but will
rather pursue short-term special and exclusive advantages, that the iden-
tifications of peoples will remain territorially bound and parochial, rather
than extending to a common humanity, and that peoples' expectations
will in general remain diffuse, truncated, and unrealistic, and include, in
particular, an anticipation that violence will be so high and pervasive as
to provide a chronic justification for the continuing military mobilization
of humankind. The assumptions made in this construct about environ-
mental variables are of course largely the opposite of those that sustain
the optimistic construct.
Whatever mid-abstraction constructs may be drawn between these
two extremes, most observers today agree that contemporary world public
order is undergoing transformations of unprecedented magnitude and
scope and that such change is likely to continue at an accelerating rate.
Happily, it is not necessary to regard any particular developmental con-
struct as inevitable in outcome. The future may, in ways about which we
do not yet know, be inevitable, but statements about the future, made in
light of present knowledge, cannot fathom the inevitable and may be ac-
corded differing degrees of probability, subject to change. It is this inde-
terminacy of the future that presents the proponents of a world public
order of human dignity with the opportunity, as well as the desperate
necessity, to refashion the global constitutive process of authoritative de-
cision in modalities better designed to secure both minimum public order
and other community demanded values.
X. ALTERNATIVES FOR AN IMPROVED WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
It may aid understanding of the need for a comprehensive approach
to recall the intimate interrelations within the global community process
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(interrelations emphasized in our opening paragraphs about the larger
context) of effective power, the constitutive process of authoritative deci-
sion, and the public order achieved in the protection of demanded values.
It is the global process of effective power that establishes and maintains,
as one of its components, the global constitutive process and, hence, iden-
tifies the basic policies to be sought in authoritative decision. It is the
global constitutive process that establishes and maintains the larger com-
munity's most minimum order, in the sense of prohibiting and regulating
major coercion and violence, and aspired optimum order, in the sense of
promoting the greatest production and widest sharing of all demanded
values, and it is upon this existing, contemporary constitutive process
that observers and decision makers who would promote peace, whether
conceived in a minimum or optimum terms, must eventually focus their
recommendations for change and improvement. Yet, through a grip of
converse determination, effective power in the global community may be
based upon participation in any and all the value processes other than
power (wealth, enlightenment, respect, well-being, skill, rectitude, loy-
alty), and the kind of constitutive process the larger community of hu-
mankind can achieve is highly dependent upon the kind of public order it
can establish in relation to all values. In consequence of all these intense
interdependences in effective and authoritative decision and in choices in
particular value processes, movement toward (or away from) both mini-
mum order and optimum order in global community process may be af-
fected, and managed, by decisions and choices about any feature of the
larger community process.
The task of highest priority, for all who are genuinely committed to
the goal values of a world public order of human dignity, would accord-
ingly, appear to be that of creating in the peoples of the world the per-
spectives necessary for accelerated movement toward a more effective
global constitutive process of authoritative decision. It has already been
indicated that it is in the conflicting, confused, and disoriented perspec-
tives of peoples - as manifested in exorbitant demands for special,
rather than common, interests; in syndromes of parochial, exclusive iden-
tifications; and in chronically unrealistic expectations about the larger
context - and not the inexorable requirements of technologically mallea-
ble environmental variables, that perpetuate the existing conditions of
contending world orders and ~ppalling threat to the whole of humankind.
The optimalization postulate (that individuals act within their capa-
bilities to maximize their values), and the many historic successes of law
as an instrument for the clarification of common interest, would suggest
that by appropriate modifications in perspectives the peoples of the world
can be encouraged to move toward both the establishment of more effec-
tive decision process and the making of more rational specific decisions
about public order values. It is hardly a novel thought that the factors -
culture, class, interest, personality, and crisis - which importantly condi-
tion peoples' perspectives can be modified to foster constructive rather
than destructive perspectives. The distinctive perspectives that must be
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created in promotion of a more viable global constitutive process include,
as indicated above, a trilogy of demands, identifications and expectations.
The demands that require strengthening are those that insist upon the
greater production and wider sharing of all human dignity values and
which emphasize the protection of common rather than special interests.
The identifications that require enhancement are those that most nearly
embrace the whole of humankind and achieve increasing pluralistic ex-
pression in both territorial and functional groupings. The relevant expec-
tations must include the recognition that all peoples, everywhere, are ir-
revocably interdependent for securing all values, even survival, and that
all peoples, without exception, have more to gain and less to lose, for
themselves and all with whom they identify, by the establishment and
maintenance of a secure global minimum order, rather than by exercise of
unilateral coercion and violence. The task for proponents of a world pub-
lic order of human dignity is, in particular, that of establishing credible
expectations that they do genuinely accept the basic policy of minimum
order, that coercion and violence are not to be used for change, or to ob-
struct peaceful change, and that they are willing reciprocally to accord
the benefits of this policy even to those who do not share their vision of
world order. The contemporary technology of communication and collab-
oration, fortunately, makes possible the widespread generation and com-
munication of these relevant perspectives.
There are of course multitudinous modalities in institution and pol-
icy that might be employed, if appropriate perspectives could be created
in the peoples of the world, to improve the existing global constitutive
process of authoritative decision toward a more secure, free, and abun-
dant world public order.~2 For centuries philosophers, clerics and kings
have proffered plans for perpetual peace, and contemporary proposals
abound for various forms of world government and lesser modifications of
prevailing institutions and practices. The difficulty with the proposals en-
visaging grandiose transformations in existing structures and practices is
that they seldom consider the means necessary to translate the vast
changes they propose into reality. The difficulty with the more modest
proposals is that they are fragmented and anecdotal in form, dealing with
isolated features of rule or procedure or structure, and are not put for-
ward in appropriate relation to the processes of effective power and au-
thoritative decision which they are designed to affect. What is urgently
needed, in more rational approach, is the creation of competent agencies,
both public and private, for undertaking a systematic canvass of every
52. For an introduction to the literature, see B. FERENCZ, A COMMON SENSE GUIDE TO
WORLD PEACE (1985); B. FERENCZ, THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON DISARMAMENT AND SE-
CURITY ISSUES, COMMON SECURITY: A BLUEPRINT FOR SURVIVAL (1982); R. FALK, THE END OF
WORLD ORDER (1983); McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 10, ch. 4; J. MIKUS, BEYOND DE-
TERRENCE: FROM POWER POLITICS TO WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1988); S. MENDLOVITZ, ON THE
CREATION OF A JUST WORLD ORDER: PREFERRED WORLDS FOR THE 1990's (1975); J. PERKINS,
THE PRUDENT PEACE (1981); Falk, A New Paradigm for International Legal Studies: Pros-
pects and Proposals, 84 YALE L. J. 969 (1975).
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feature of effective power, constitutive process, and public order decision
to ascertain a wide range of possible improvements and to establish pri-
orities among potential improvements in terms of relation to human dig-
nity values, temporal need and acceptability, economy, and
effectiveness. ~3
It is most unlikely, so long as the contention between rival systems of
world public order intensifies, that the major states of the world can be
persuaded to take important steps by agreement toward the greater col-
lectivization and centralization of the existing global constitutive process.
It is too difficult to clarify a common interest between a public order
dedicated to expansion by major coercion and violence and those who re-
gard change by peaceful procedures only as indispensable to any law and
stable public order. The most that the proponents of a world public order
of human dignity may now be able to do would appear to be to achieve
and promote enlightenment about the conditions of minimum order, the
potentialities of an optimum world public order, and the policies and
measures that might, through appropriate interpretations of existing
agreements and the uniformities of customary law, gradually move hu-
mankind toward the necessary changes in global constitutive process.
Such a stance may be criticized as mere incrementalism, in a situation of
desperate need, but it could be made an incrementalism guided by a clear
vision of basic goals and a realistic understanding of the conditions of
their achievement.
In the absence of comprehensive and detailed studies, it is difficult to
offer definitive illustration of the changes in policies and measures that
might transform the existing global constitutive process into a more effec-
tive instrument of minimum and optimum order. It may be remembered
that the existing, most comprehensive process includes all the decisions
that identify authoritative decision-makers, project the basic policies of
the larger community, establish appropriate structures in aid of decision,
allocate bases of power for sanctioning purposes, prescribe procedures for
the making of particular decisions, and secure the performance of all the
different types of decision functions (intelligence, promotion, prescrip-
tion, invocation, application, termination, appraisal) that are necessary to
the making and application of community policy. The significance of any
change or improvement in a particular feature of this process must of
course depend at any given time upon both the configuration of all other
features of the process and impacts from protected features of value
processes other than power. It may be possible, however, to make highly
impressionistic, even cryptic, suggestions of the kinds of policies and mea-
sures that could, in appropriate context, point in the direction of a more
secure, free, and abundant world public order.
We proceed phase by phase through the existing global constitutive
53. It could have been in recognition of this need that the United States Institute of
Peace was established.
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A. Participation in Decision Making
Seek a more genuinely representative and responsible balancing of
power through the creation of more rational intergovernmental regional
organizations.
Encourage the creation of political parties, pressure groups, and pri-
vate associations dedicated to all values for participation in transnational
activities.
Recognize the importance of the individual human being, as ultimate
actor in all organizations, through provision of increasing access to all au-
thoritative arenas.
B. Perspectives: Basic General Community Policies
Reinforce commitment to minimum order, that no change be effected
by coercion and violence, by explicit recognition of the complementarity
of Articles 2(4) and 51 of the United Nations Charter, emphasizing a
broad conception of self-defense.
Interpret Article 2(4) of the Charter to prohibit "wars of liberation."
Interpret Article 51 of the Charter to authorize states to take mea-
sures in self-defense when attack is imminent, without awaiting the fact
of armed attack.
Reinforce commitment to optimum order by consolidating the emer-
gence of a global bill of human rights through appropriate interpretation
of the Charter, the major covenants, national decisions, and customary
behavior.
C. Arenas: Structures of Authority
1. Establishment
Balance structures of authority in geographic range between central-
ized and decentralized, and integrate in a way to take into account the
intensity of impacts within different geographic areas.
Expand the scope and authority of the executive within international
governmental organizations.
Staff parliamentary bodies more effectively in aid of intelligence and
appraisal functions for the better clarification of policies.
Multiply occasional conferences for employment of the diplomatic in-
strument in the clarification and projection of policies.
Provide panels of skilled experts for the voluntary adjudication (me-
diation, conciliation, arbitration) of disputes. With modern technology,
these panels could be moved quickly about the world for sessions in con-
venient locations.
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In promoting policies of openness and responsibility, aggrieved- indi-
viduals and groups might be allowed to represent themselves or to be rep-
resented by others (including institutionalized omsbudsmen) in a wide
range of structures of authority.
Compulsory jurisdiction for adjudication might be increased with re-
spect to matters not involving state security.
D. Bases of Power
The promotion of minimum and optimum order might be enhanced
by a more pluralistic distribution of both authority and effective control.
1. Authority
Insofar as compatible with the genuine security interests of states,
reject claims of "political questions" and "domestic jurisdictions" that
immunize activities from legal evaluation.
For the protection of inclusive interests, accord inclusive institutions
a more ample competence with respect to the intelligence, promotion, ap-
praisal, and invocation functions; with respect to the prescription, appli-
cation, and termination functions, accord a broad competence on matters
that do not endanger the security of states.
Allocate to the separate states the competence necessary to protect
their exclusive interests, and settle conflicts between states by the criteria
of reasonableness as determined through a disciplined, systematic exami-
nation of the features of the larger context that affects interests.
2. Control
Through coalition, alliance, and regionalization, seek a more rational
organization of the control of the resource bases of the earth-space
community.
By agreement and unilateral action, reduce the resources being de-
voted to armaments and military purposes.
Expand multiple networks of transnational associations, gOVE:rnmen-
tal and private, to increase the greater production and wider sharing of all
the values that affect power, as well as the quality of life.
Encourage educational institutions to increase their inquiries about
the conditions, policies, and alternatives necessary to an improved world
public order.
Employ the technology of modern communication to promote a
world public opinion that demands and sustains a public order of human
dignity.
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E. Strategies: Authoritative Procedures
Seek an appropriate integration in support of public order of all
strategies (diplomatic, ideological, economic, and military), with a strong
emphasis upon persuasion rather than coercion.
In revival of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, collectivize
and centralize such coercion as may be necessary and proportionate to
the maintenance of public order.
Enhance the diplomatic instrument by minimizing the employment
of special majorities and vetoes, other than in relation to matters affect-
ing the security of states, and by rationalizing the law of international
agreements.
Maintain free transnational channels of communication for more ef-
fective employment of the ideological instrument.
Employ the economic instrument to improve the channels of trade,
financial assistance, and development in the greater production and wider
distribution of goods and services.
In performance of decision functions, employ the best available sci-
entific procedures in exploration of facts and potential policies, and make
findings as dependable, contextual, and creative as possible.
In prescriptive and applicative decision, final characterization of
facts and policies should be made deliberate, rational in relation to goals,
and non-provocative, employing contextual analysis in evaluation and
choice of alternatives.
F. Outcomes in Particular Types of Decisions
The culminating outcomes of constitutive process include both the
establishment and maintenance of the process itself and a continuous
flow of particular decisions affecting all public order values.
1. The Intelligence Function
(gathering, processing, and disseminating information relevant to
decision)
Accord international governmental organizations the resources neces-
sary to increase their role in inquiry and communication about the goals,
trends, conditioning factors, possible futures, and alternatives relevant to
improved minimum and optimum order.
2. The Promotion Function
(taking initiatives and mobilizing opinion toward prescription of commu-
nity policies)
Encourage, by according appropriate access to authority and other
resources, a tremendous expansion of pressure groups and private associa-
tions dedicated to mobilizing the predispositions necessary to an im-
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proved world public order.
3. The Prescribing Function
(projection of community policy that IS both authoritative and
controlling)
Recognize the increasing role of international governmental organiza-
tion in creating and communicating expectations about future decisions.
Weight voting in international governmental organization and special
conferences in ways to secure higher conformity with genuine democracy
and responsibility.
Establish distinctive specialized institutions, manned by scholars and
experts rather than by representatives of governments, for the clarifica-
tion and recommendation of policies upon important particular problems.
Improve facilities and policies for the making of multilateral agree-
ments for the projection of authoritative general community policy.
Recognize the dominating importance of uniformities in state deci-
sion and practice in creating expectations about the requirements of fu-
ture decision.
Understand the interlocked, cumulative impact of communication
from all sources in creating expectations about future decision.
4. The Invoking Function
(provisional characterization of events In terms of community
prescriptions)
Aggrieved participants in global community process might be af-
forded opportunities in appropriate arenas to make timely, non-provoca-
tive initiations of the application function to redress putative wrongs.
A specialized invocation competence might be accorded the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations or established omsbudsmen.
5. The Applying Function
(authoritative characterization of events in terms of community prescrip-
tion and management of sanctioning measures to secure conformity)lH
Encourage the resolution of controversies by the parties themselves
through diplomacy, mediation, and conciliation.
Maintain panels for third-party adjudication when participants con-
sent. Create specialized, perhaps mobile, panels for particular problems.
Within national constitutive processes, establish unequivocally that
54. The paper in this symposium by Professor Bilder offers examples of alternatives
that might be considered for improvement of the application function. Bilder, International
Third Party Dispute Settlement, 17 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 471 (1989).
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international law is the law of the land, to be applied by all branches of
government; reduce to minimum effect all doctrines of governmental im-
munity, act of state, political questions, and so on.
Whatever the arena of application, emphasize the importance of pro-
cedures for inquiry that both employ a contextual examination of facts in
relation to major community goals and principles for the interpretation of
prescriptions that emphasize such major goals in all factual contexts.
6. The Terminating Function
(putting an end to prescriptions and arrangements effected under
prescriptions)
Establish specialized agencies for reviewing existing prescriptions
and arrangements, identifying the obsolete or obsolescent, and recom-
mending measures for ameliorating the destructive costs of necessary
change.
7. The Appraising Function
(evaluating decision process in terms of achievement of basic community
goals and ascribing responsibility)
Establish specialized agencies, insulated from immediate pressures of
threat or inducement, for the continuous appraisal of successes and fail-
ures in the management of authoritative decision and for the recommen-
dation of decision process and decisions better designed for the realiza-
tion of major goals.
A comprehensive inquiry would of course add exploration of the im-
pacts of the protected features of the larger community's various value
processes upon the establishment and maintenance of constitutive
process.
An appropriate concluding note of restrained optimism may perhaps
be that voiced by my late colleague, Harold Lasswell, in closing his book
on The Future of Political Science:
It is impossible to contemplate the present status of man without per-
ceiving the cosmic roles that he and other advanced forms of life may
eventually play. We are, perhaps, introducing self-awareness into cos-
mic process. With awareness of self comes deliberate formation and
pursuit of value goals. For tens of thousands of years, man was accus-
tomed to living in relatively local environments and to cooperating on
a parochial scale. Today we are on the verge of exploring a habitat far
less circumscribed than earth. The need for a worldwide system of
public order - a comprehensive plan of cooperation - is fearfully
urgent. From the interplay of the study and practice of cooperation
we may eventually move more wisely, if not more rapidly, toward ful-
filling the as-yet-mysterious potentialities of the cosmic process.~~
55. H. LASSWELL, THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 242 (1963).
